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ABSTRACT: Why so many people pay their taxes, although fines and audit probability 
are low, has become a central question in the tax compliance literature. Concepts of 
Homo Economicus, endowed with a more refined motivation structure, help to shed 
light on the tax compliance puzzle. This paper provides empirical evidence for the 
relevance of conditional cooperation, using survey data from 30 European countries. 
The findings suggest that a higher perceived tax evasion leads to a lower tax morale, 
also when controlling for additional factors in a multivariate analysis.  
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RESUMEN: El porqué la gente paga sus impuestos a pesar de la baja probabilidad de 
ser inspeccionado y del relativamente bajo importe de las sanciones se ha convertido en 
la pregunta central de la literatura del cumplimiento fiscal. La utilización del concepto 
de Homo Economicus, dotado de una motivación algo más refinada, ayuda a entender el 
puzzle del cumplimiento fiscal. Este trabajo proporciona evidencia empírica sobre la 
relevancia de la cooperación condicional, usando información de una encuesta para 30 
países europeos. Los resultados sugieren que un mayor nivel percibido de evasion fiscal 
reduce el nivel de moral impositiva, incluso cuando se controla por otros factores 
adicionales en un análisis multivariante. 
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1. Taxation as a social act 
Nobody likes paying taxes. The most popular instrument to “force” people to pay their 
taxes is deterrence policy. In line with the economics-of-crime approach, based on the 
expected utility maximization calculus, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) presented a 
formal model, showing that the extent of tax evasion is negatively correlated with the 
probability of detection and the degree of punishment. However, this pathbreaking 
model has many shortcomings. People who exhibit empirically observed levels of risk 
aversion on average pay their taxes, although there is a low probability of getting caught 
and being penalized. Thus, people are more honest than deterrence models would 
predict. There is a wide gap between the risk aversion that would guarantee such a high 
compliance and the much lower individual risk aversion observed in reality (see Graetz 
and Wilde 1985, Alm, McClelland and Schulze 1992, Frey and Feld 2002). Tax 
compliance experiments also indicate that individuals report a higher level of income 
than the expected utility model would predict (for an overview see Alm 1999, Torgler 
2002). Many years ago, Baldry (1987, p. 377), pointed out: “Rather than question the 
experimental method, these results suggest that it is perhaps the theory which needs 
revision (...)” (p. 377).  
Similarly, the high co-operation observed is not specific to the tax compliance literature. 
Ultimatum experiments have shown that, in many experiments, the modal offer is 
(50,50), the mean offer somewhere around (40,60), and the smaller the offer, the higher 
the probability that the offer is rejected (see Ochs and Roth 1989, Roth 1995). Public 
good experiments indicate that, on average, subjects contribute between 40 and 60 
percent of their endowment to a public good (see, e.g., Ledyard 1995, Davis and Holt 
1993). 
Traditional models also have the disadvantage that they treat taxation as an isolated act. 
Subjects do not act as isolated individuals playing a “game against nature”. In this 
paper, we emphasize the relevance that taxation is a social act. The behavior of other 
taxpayers is of great importance in understanding taxpayers’ compliance. As a 
consequence, theories on pro-social behavior, that take the behavior of others into 
account, may be a promising concept. Taxpayers pay their taxes conditionally, 
depending on the pro-social behavior of other taxpayers, being more willing to pay their 
taxes, the more others are perceived to be honest. The extent to which others also 
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contribute triggers more or less cooperation and systematically influences the 
willingness to contribute. We use survey data to test whether “conditional cooperation” 
can be identified. Section II gives an overview of the existing literature on social 
comparisons. In Section III, we present our theoretical approach and develop our 
hypotheses. Section IV presents the empirical results and Section V finishes with some 
concluding remarks.  
 
2. Overview of the existing literature 
Standard expected utility theory has difficulties in explaining taxation behavior well. In 
contrast, there is a lack of empirical evidence in the tax compliance literature testing the 
effects of social comparisons. Two studies in the 80s ran experiments to investigate 
social comparisons, with mixed results. In the experiment by Spicer and Becker (1980) 
57 students participated and they were told that their own tax tables were based on a tax 
of 40 percent. 19 participants were told that the average tax rate was 65 percent, a 
further 19 participants were told that the average tax rate was 15 percent and finally 
another 19 participants were told that all participants had same tax rate (truth value, 40 
percent). On average, 23 percent of total taxes payable were evaded. The group with the 
perceived high tax evaded 32 percent, the group with the apparently low tax 12 percent 
and the group with the medium taxation 25 percent. The results suggest that social 
comparisons are relevant. Similarly, Webley, Morris and Amstutz (1985) used a design 
altering the information about taxation: “Your tax rate is 30 percent and the average tax 
rate is x”. The variable x had the values 15 percent, 30 percent and 45 percent. In 
contrast to Spicer and Becker (1980), altering the information did not have a significant 
effect on tax evasion (see also Webley, Robben and Morris 1988). Thus, the effect of 
social comparisons on tax compliance seems not to be clear, according to these papers.   
However, these two experiments were designed to analyze the causal relationship 
between inequity and tax evasion. The design is influenced by the equity theory, which 
points out that satisfaction and behavior are linked not only to the objective outcome 
levels, but also to outcomes received in relation to those which were judged to be fair 
(see Tyler and Smith 1998). Furthermore, a lack of equity between taxpayer’s own 
exchange and those of others creates a sense of distress. Disadvantage in such a 
situation creates anger, whilst advantage creates feelings of guilt (see Adams 1965, 
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Homans 1961). People will engage in behavior, such as tax evasion, in an effort to 
restore equity. Neither study analyzes the interaction between taxpayers.  
Tax compliance experiments with a public good structure would give us a better 
opportunity of analyzing social interactions within a group. Alm, Jackson and McKee 
(1993) implemented various treatments in which a public good was provided. Taxes 
paid in one round were multiplied by a factor, and the resulting amount was then 
redistributed in equal shares to the members of the group. The data indicates that the 
average compliance is always higher in the presence of a public good. However, the 
study failed to distinguish between the effect of public goods and the effect of 
taxpayers’ interaction. One way to deal with this problem would have been to build an 
experimental design with fixed public transfers treatment, regardless of how much taxes 
subjects pay, and a treatment where public transfers depend on the amount of taxes paid, 
where subjects take the others’ compliance into account (see Kim 1994).  
More evidence on pro-social behavior is provided by laboratory public good 
experiments (see, e.g., Cronson 1998, Sonnemans, Schram and Offerman 1999, Keser 
and van Winden 2000)1. Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) designed an experiment 
that, compared to previous studies, tried to carry out an improved check on the extent to 
which subjects are conditional cooperators. Participants had to indicate their 
contribution to the public good for different average levels of contributions by other 
group members’ contribution. They found that 50 percent of the subjects were 
conditionally cooperative.  
In general, several theories try to explain conditional cooperation. Most of the papers 
proposed theories of reciprocity (for an overview, see e.g., Rabin 1998, Falk and Fehr 
2002). Adapted to the tax compliance context, this would mean that, if many citizens 
pay their taxes, a taxpayer would also feel obligated to contribute and pay their taxes. 
On the other hand, if many individuals evade taxes, a taxpayer will not feel committed 
to pay their taxes. Another promising concept is conformity (for an overview see 
Heinrich 2004). This means that the motivation of behaving in a conditionally 
cooperative way may be influenced by the taxpayers’ wish to fulfill the social norm of 
paying their taxes and thus to behave according to society’s rules. Thus, the second 
                                                 
1 Sausgruber (2003), who analyzed team spirit in an experiment, also found that subjects contribute 
significantly more, the higher the average contribution within their team (excluding their own 
contribution). 
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approach is less connected to incentives and benefits. Bardsley and Sausgruber (2003) 
point out that: “a conformist would contribute to a useless public “good”, which benefits 
no-one, if he observes enough others making contributions. A reciprocally motivated 
agent would not, since he does not benefit from their behavior” (p. 4). Individuals want 
their behavior to be matched with the common behavior (Heinrich 2004). Two recent 
laboratory studies indicate the strength of “conformity” compared to “reciprocity” (see 
Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004, and Bardsley and Sausgruber 2003). On the other hand, 
the study by Falk, Fischbacher and Gächter (2003) indicates considerable support for 
reciprocity. They created a laboratory situation in which each subject was a member of 
two economically identical groups, where only the members varied. They observed that 
the same subjects contributed differently, depending on group behavior (contributing 
more to the group when cooperation was higher). Kurzban et al. (2001) found in their 
experimental paper that subjects don’t want to contribute more than other group 
members. Furthermore, individuals used their own contribution to elicit others’ 
cooperation, which corresponds to reciprocal behavior.  
A further reason for cooperation can be found when charity organizations are observed. 
They have an incentive to ask donors for permission to announce their gifts, as the 
announcement is likely to have a positive effect on others’ contribution and thus helps 
to overcome the problem of free-riding. It also sends out a signal about the quality of 
the public good (see Vesterlund 2003)2. 
Pro-social behavior has mostly been analyzed in laboratory experiments. However, 
laboratory experiments have been criticized because of not being an accurate reflection 
of the choices in “the outside world”, as the setting is artificial. Furthermore, 
experiments that analyze social interactions may be more sensitive to an experimenter 
effect, which reduces the validity of the experiment, influencing participants’ view of 
what to do or creating the incentive to outwit the experimenter and seeing the whole 
situation as a “gamelike” atmosphere (see, e.g., Starmer 1999, Cross 1980). Frey and 
Meier (2004a) analyze patterns of pro-social behavior outside the lab setting. They 
investigated students’ decisions regarding the contribution to two Social Funds 
administered by the University of Zurich. This situation corresponds to an n-person 
public good setting, covering around 33’000 persons (and a panel set of 136’000 
                                                 
2 However, according to Potters et al. (2001), “announcing” only has an effect when the quality of the 
public good is not common knowledge.  
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observations). The field observations are also supplemented with surveys. Many 
students seemed to behave pro-socially. They found evidence of conditional 
cooperation. The more individuals expected others to cooperate, the more they 
cooperated. However, Frey and Meier (2004b) observed that conditional cooperation 
depends on past behavior. People who never contributed in the past do not change their 
behavior. The strongest reaction to the information about others’ behavior was observed 
with individuals who were indifferent regarding the contribution. Surprisingly, they 
found that when students were informed that few other students contributed to the 
Social Funds, they did not respond as expected. If anything, they tended to give more, 
not less. 
Our discussion of the existing literature suggests that the question of whether, and to 
what extent, individuals as tax payers react to the behavior of other tax payers is still 
wide open. 
 
3. Theoretical Approach and Testable Hypotheses 
Contrary to most of the previous studies, we are going to work with survey data 
provided by the European Values Survey (EVS) 1999/2000. It is a European wide 
investigation of socio-cultural and political change. The survey has assessed the basic 
values and beliefs of people all over Europe. The EVS was first carried out in 1981-83, 
then in 1990-91 and again in 1999-2001, with an increasing number of participating 
countries. Our study considers 30 representative national samples of at least 1000 
individuals per country. Surveys allow us to work with a representative set of 
individuals, an aspect often not met in experimental studies. Many experiments are done 
with students as participants. The problem is that students correspond to a subject pool 
with a higher level of education and a higher IQ than average citizens. They often come 
from families with a higher income than the average and their age ranges are limited 
(Fehr et al. 2003). Considering the tax compliance context, it can be argued that 
students do not have much experience in filling out tax forms. However, only a few 
studies investigate whether students are a satisfactory sample for studies of tax 
behavior, and the results are mixed. On the one hand, Baldry (1987) finds that students’ 
responses are no different from those of other subjects in tax compliance experiments. 
On the other hand, Gërxhani and Schram (2001), in their cross-country experiments in 
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The Netherlands and Albania, show the importance of subject pools. In another context, 
Frey and Meier (2004a) also observe that people differ in their pro-social attitudes. The 
donation to funds strongly varies among students with different majors, controlling in a 
multivariate analysis for other personal characteristics, such as age and gender. 
Conditional cooperation also depends on environmental and institutional settings. 
However, the effect of institutions on pro-social behavior has not been analyzed 
intensively.  Heinrich et al. (2001) undertook a large cross-cultural study of behavior, 
using ultimatum, public good, and dictator games. They found a large variation across 
the different cultural groups and argue that preferences and/or expectations are affected 
by group-specific conditions, such as institutions or cultural fairness norms. Surveys 
conducted in several countries, such as the EVS, are a good instrument to investigate 
conditional cooperation in different societies. Our study allows us to differentiate 
between Western and Eastern European countries. In general, surveys may help to 
complement previous studies on conditional cooperation which used laboratory 
experiments.  
Our dependent variable is tax morale, defined as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. It 
is the individuals’ willingness to pay taxes or, in other words, the moral obligation to 
pay taxes, or the belief in contributing to society by paying taxes. To assess the level of 
tax morale from the EVS, we use the following question:  
“Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or somewhere in between: … Cheating on tax if you have 
the chance”.  
The question leads to a ten-scale index of tax morale, with the two extreme points 
“never justified” and “always justified”. The scale has been recoded into a four-point 
scale (0, 1, 2, 3), with the value 3 standing for “never justified”. The points 4-10 have 
been integrated into the value 0 due to a lack of variance.  
Many researchers have argued that tax morale helps to explain the high degree of tax 
compliance. However, many of the studies treat tax morale as an exogenous residual. 
Using tax morale as a dependent variable allows us to go beyond treating tax morale as 
a black box or a residuum, and thus analyze which factors help shape or maintain tax 
morale. The EVS has the advantage that it is designed as a wide-ranging survey. This 
reduces the probability of participants being suspicious and of creating framing effects 
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with other contexts relevant for taxation. It can certainly be discussed whether it is more 
appropriate to use an index rather than a single question to measure tax morale. 
However, a single question has the advantage that problems associated with the 
construction of an index can be avoided. The measurement of tax morale is also not free 
of biases. It could be argued that a taxpayer, who has been evading in the past, will tend 
to excuse this kind of behavior when reporting a higher tax morale. 
The following question in the EVS allows us to investigate conditional cooperation: 
“According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following: Cheating on tax if 
they have the chance” (4= almost all, 1= almost none)? 
Lewis (1982, p. 144) pointed out many years ago already that there might be a  
“tax subculture, with its own set of unwritten rules and regulations. Thus I am more 
likely to evade not only because I have friends who, I know, have got away with it (so 
why shouldn’t I?) but also because evasion is ethically acceptable among my friends 
(…) Furthermore, ‘no friends of mine can be criminals’ (…) ‘What’s good enough for 
fine, upstanding citizens like Fred Bloggs, John Doe, Donald Campbell, Herman 
Schmitt and Hans Anderson is good enough for me’”. 
On the basis of these considerations, our main hypothesis is: 
H:  Tax morale decreases if people perceive that tax evasion is common. On the 
other hand, if people believe that others are honest, their willingness to pay 
taxes increases. 
The correlation between the perceived tax evasion and tax morale will be investigated in 
a multivariate analysis, controlling for other factors to better isolate the relationship. A 
specification based on a multivariate analysis has the obvious advantage of presenting a 
more balanced view of the role of conditional cooperation, separating the effects of 
other exogenous variables. If conditional cooperation differed systematically in some 
other characteristic that also affects tax morale, the results could be misleading.  
Using a cross-section of individuals with the EVS does not allow us to reduce causality 
problems and thus to give complete information about the direction of the relationship 
defined in the hypothesis. The direction of causality is open. It might be argued that 
one’s own willingness to pay taxes might lead to the expectation that others behave in 
the same way. There is a lack of adequate variables that could serve as instruments to 
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control for endogeneity of our main independent variable using a 2SLS model/IV 
method3. The EVS is not a panel survey, and thus a survey that follows individuals over 
time, which would have better allowed us to study the dynamics of adjustment. 
Furthermore, the question referring to conditional cooperation has only been asked in 
the last wave of 1999-2001. Longitudinal data would help reduce problems of 
unobserved individual heterogeneity4. In general, in our case, an ordered probit model 
ranking information of the scaled dependent variable tax morale is appropriate. To 
measure the quantitative effect of a variable on tax morale, the marginal effects are 
calculated, as the equation has a nonlinear form. The marginal effect indicates the 
change in the percentage of taxpayers (or the probability of) having a specific tax 
morale level, when the independent variable increases by one unit. For simplicity, the 
marginal effects in all estimates are only presented for the highest tax morale value. 
Weighted ordered probit estimates are conducted in order to correct the samples and 
thus to get a reflection of the national distribution. Furthermore, it should be noticed that 
answers, such as “don’t know”, and missing values have been eliminated in all 
estimations. 
The following econometric model captures the basic relationship between tax morale 
and perceived tax evasion: 
iiii PTECTLTM εβββ +⋅+⋅+= 210    (1) 
where TMi denotes the individual degree of tax morale.  
CTLi is a vector of control variables at the individual level, covering demographic, 
economic and religious variables, and PTEi is our main independent variable (perceived 
tax evasion). Previous tax compliance studies have shown the relevance of considering 
socio-demographic, socio-economic variables and proxies for religiosity (for an 
overview, see Torgler 2003a, Torgler 2003b). Table 1 discusses the hypothesized 
impact of the control variables on tax morale.  
                                                 
3 The relevance of the IV method depends strongly on the predictive power of the instruments in the first 
stage equation. Furthermore, it is relevant to first conduct a Hausman Chi-square test in order to see 
whether exogeneity cannot be rejected. 
 
4 Individual fixed effects would help to control for the individual specific characteristics not captured by 
the control variables. However, there would still be the problem of biases, due to unobserved individual 
heterogeneity that varies over time. This would make it relevant to employ an IV method.  
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Income could not be included in our study. The income scale in the EVS is based on 
national currencies, which reduces the possibility of comparing nations in a cross-
country comparison. A proxy for the economic situation could be the self-classification 
of the respondents into the various economic classes. However, there are too many 
missing values for this variable, based also on the fact that the variable has not been 
collected in some countries. The variable EDUCATION provides quite a good proxy for 
the economic situation. The variable is highly correlated in our data set with the income 





















The Predicted Impact of the Control Variables 
 
Variables Hypothesis Interpretation 
AGE (under 30, 30-39, 40-49, 50-
59, 60-70, 70+), with under 30 as 
reference group 
+ Higher age leads to a higher tax morale  
Older people have acquired greater social stakes, such as 
material goods, status, and a stronger dependency on the 
reactions of others, raising the potential costs of a sanction 
increase. This leads to a higher tax morale.   
GENDER (men/women), with men 
in the reference group  
- Women have a higher tax morale than men. Previous 
studies show the tendency that women are more compliant 
and less self-reliant than men. 
EDUCATION (continuous variable, 
see Appendix, Table A1). 
+/-  More educated individuals… 
+ are better aware of the services the state provides; 
- are more critical about how the state acts or spends tax 
revenues; 
- better understand opportunities for evasion and avoidance, 
which negatively influence tax morale and are in a better 
position to take risks; 
-/+ As a proxy of income: depending on risk preferences 
and the progression of the income tax schedules, income 
may increase or reduce tax morale (tendency to be 
negative); 
+ have higher social stakes and are subject to stronger 
social pressure and therefore take less risk. 
MARITAL STATUS (married, 
divorced, separated, widowed, 
single), with married in the 
reference group 
+ Individuals with stronger social networks try to have a 
higher tax morale. Thus, e.g., married people  have a higher 
tax morale than singles. 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS (full-
time employed, part-time 
employed, self-employed, 
unemployed, at home, student, 
retired, other), with full-time 
employed in the reference group).  
- Self-employed taxpayers have lower tax morale than full-
time employees. They have higher compliance costs and 
taxes are more visible. 
 
RELIGIOSITY (proxy: CHURCH 
ATTENDANCE), measures how 
much time individuals devote to 
religion. 
+ Higher religiosity leads to higher tax morale. Studies have 
shown that religiosity leads to higher compliance with the 
law, and reduces tax evasion. 
REGIONS (WESTERN AND 
EASTERN EUROPE), with Eastern 
Europe in the reference group 
+ The reform process caused disorientation and a heavy 
economic burden (see Kasper and Streit 1999 and Gërxhani 
2002). The rapid collapse of institutional structures 
produced a vacuum in many countries, followed by large 
social costs, especially in terms of worsening income 
inequality and poverty rates and bad institutional 
conditions, based on uncertainty and high transaction costs. 
Furthermore, citizens in many transition countries at the 
beginning of the transition process were not used to paying 
taxes (see, e.g., Kornai 1990, Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab 2000). Thus, taxpayers may have strongly reacted 
to tax policy changes necessary for the transition from a 
centrally controlled to a market economy. Torgler (2003c) 
and Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2004) show that 
these circumstances have an impact on tax morale. Our 
expectation is therefore that residents of Eastern European 
countries will, other things being equal, exhibit a lower 




4. Econometric results 
Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients using two different estimation techniques to 
identify the effect of the determinants discussed above on tax morale. Equation (1) uses 
robust standard errors while equation (2) uses standard errors adjusted for the clustering 
on 30 countries, thus taking into account unobservable country specific characteristics. 
Clustering leads to a decrease in the z-values, but has no impact on the marginal effects. 
The estimation results most importantly suggest that the higher the tax evasion of other 
persons is perceived, the lower tax morale is. This is consistent with our main 
hypothesis of tax morale decreasing if people perceive that tax evasion is a common 
phenomenon. The size of the effect is substantial: when perceived tax evasion rises by 
one unit, the percentage of persons reporting a high tax morale falls by 7.4 percentage 
points.  
In order to reach an unbiased test of our hypotheses, the estimates of the effect of the 
perceived tax evasion by other persons on tax morale takes into account a large number 
of control variables. They are grouped into five sets: demographic factors, marital 
status, employment status, religiosity, social norms and living in Western Europe. The 
estimated coefficients are consistent with the hypotheses listed in Table 1. In particular, 
older persons and women exhibit higher tax morale. Education negatively affects tax 
morale, suggesting that persons with higher education are more critical of the way the 
government spends the tax revenues, and are better able to evade taxes. Divorced and 
separated persons have the lowest tax morale, perhaps because they have become more 
cynical, or because persons who are cynical by nature are more likely to end up being 
divorced. As predicted, the self-employed have a lower tax morale. Not surprisingly, 
church attendance is correlated with higher tax morale. The estimated coefficient for 
WESTERN EUROPE suggests that the institutional crisis in many transition countries 
in Eastern Europe, after the collapse of communism, negatively affected the tax morale 
of the citizens living there. The marginal effects in eq. (1) indicate that being from 
Western Europe rather than from Eastern Europe reduces the probability of stating that 






Determinants of Tax Morale in Europe 
 
                
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat. Marg.  Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
   Effects    Effects 
        
INDEPENDENT V. 
Robust standard  errors 
 
 Eq. 1   
Standard errors adjusted for 
 clustering on countries 
 
Eq.2 
PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.186*** -18.110 -0.074  -0.186*** -4.710 -0.074 
CONTROL VARIABLES        
(1) Demographic Factors        
AGE 30-39 0.099*** 3.890 0.039  0.099*** 2.650 0.039 
AGE 40-49 0.216*** 7.970 0.085  0.216*** 5.220 0.085 
AGE 50-59 0.298*** 10.150 0.116  0.298*** 6.180 0.116 
AGE 60-69 0.318*** 8.630 0.124  0.318*** 4.860 0.124 
AGE 70+ 0.446*** 10.340 0.171  0.446*** 5.740 0.171 
WOMAN 0.123*** 7.800 0.049  0.123*** 6.020 0.049 
EDUCATION -0.004** -2.530 -0.001  -0.004 -1.040 -0.001 
(2) Marital Status        
WIDOWED -0.048 -1.590 -0.019  -0.048 -1.640 -0.019 
DIVORCED -0.174*** -6.200 -0.069  -0.174*** -5.230 -0.069 
SEPARATED -0.187*** -3.430 -0.075  -0.187*** -3.930 -0.075 
NEVER MARRIED -0.084*** -3.740 -0.034  -0.084** -2.160 -0.034 
(3)Employment Status        
PART TIME EMPLOYED -0.083*** -2.940 -0.033  -0.083** -2.250 -0.033 
SELFEMPLOYED -0.106*** -3.290 -0.042  -0.106** -2.340 -0.042 
UNEMPLOYED 0.131*** 4.320 0.052  0.131*** 2.900 0.052 
AT HOME 0.019 0.640 0.008  0.019 0.370 0.008 
STUDENT -0.055 -1.510 -0.022  -0.055 -1.130 -0.022 
RETIRED -0.091*** -3.070 -0.036  -0.091** -2.240 -0.036 
OTHER 0.083 1.500 0.033  0.083 1.390 0.033 
(4) Religiosity        
CHURCH ATTENDANCE 0.041*** 13.590 0.016  0.041*** 3.630 0.016 
(5) Culture/Regions        
WESTERN EUROPE 0.089*** 6.000 0.035  0.089 0.860 0.035 
        
Number of observations 32610    32610   
Prob > chi2  0.000       0.000     
Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale (0 to 3). In the reference group are AGE<30, MAN, 
MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYED, EASTERN EUROPE. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p 
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01.Marginal effect = high tax morale score (3). 
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Instead of constructing a dummy variable that differentiates between Western and 
Eastern Europe, it might be interesting to take a closer look at differences between 
particular countries. Table 3 includes country dummies in the estimation equation, using 
GERMANY as a reference. The coefficient of the variable PERCEIVED TAX 
EVASION remains highly statistically significant with an increase in the marginal 
effects. The control variables are in line with the estimates reported in Table 2 and are 
therefore not explicitly reported. Among the Western European countries, Belgium 
exhibits the biggest negative difference compared to Germany, with marginal effects 
around 20 percentage points. Malta has the highest tax morale of all countries. It is 
interesting to note that the Central Eastern European (CEE) countries, Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Poland exhibit higher tax morale 
than Germany. The coefficient of the first four countries is statistically significant. 
Table 3 also reveals that Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries, such as Russia, Belarus, 
Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia or Latvia have lower tax morale than Central Eastern 
European (CEE) countries. It seems that CEE countries have been more successful than 
FSU countries at designing tax systems, tax administrations, and government structures 















Tax Morale Among Different Countries 
        
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
   Effects 
INDEPENDENT V. Eq. 3      
PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.243*** -21.92 -0.097 
COUNTRIES     
Western European Countries    
Germany  ref. group   
Austria 0.083* 1.650 0.033 
Belgium -0.530*** -11.000 -0.206 
Great Britain 0.002 0.040 0.001 
Denmark 0.246*** 4.630 0.096 
Finland -0.048 -0.870 -0.019 
France -0.288*** -5.830 -0.114 
Iceland 0.185*** 3.410 0.073 
Ireland 0.072 1.220 0.028 
Italy 0.099** 2.160 0.039 
Malta 0.737*** 12.380 0.264 
Netherlands -0.251*** -4.760 -0.100 
North Ireland 0.026 0.410 0.010 
Portugal 0.044 0.650 0.017 
Spain -0.124** -2.380 -0.049 
Sweden -0.067 -1.150 -0.027 
Eastern European Countries    
Belarus -0.835*** -14.760 -0.308 
Bulgaria 0.217*** 3.690 0.085 
Croatia 0.065 0.900 0.026 
Czech Republic 0.189*** 4.060 0.074 
Estonia -0.409*** -7.660 -0.161 
Greece -0.200*** -3.840 -0.080 
Hungary 0.536*** 8.650 0.200 
Latvia -0.018 -0.320 -0.007 
Lithuania -0.592*** -8.790 -0.228 
Poland 0.083 1.470 0.033 
Romania -0.011 -0.200 -0.004 
Russia -0.272*** -6.100 -0.108 
Slovakian Republic  0.115** 2.270 0.045 
Ukraine -0.473*** -8.940 -0.185 
ALL OTHER VARIABLES INCLUDED    
Number of observations 32610     
Prob > chi2  0.000   
Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale (0 to 3). In the reference 
group are AGE<30, MAN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYED, 
GERMANY.  Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. Marginal effect = highest tax morale score (3). 
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One reason may be that FSU countries experienced a higher decline of output during the 
years of transition than CEE countries. Furthermore, reforms have progressed much 
faster in CEE countries than in FSU countries (see Campos and Coricelli 2002). FSU 
countries have been more affected by the collapse and the economic crisis. For 
transition countries, it is difficult to find an acceptable level of state activity, as the 
collapse of communism saw the collapse of a vast state apparatus. As a consequence, it 
is no surprise that CEE has a higher tax morale. This finding is in line with the results 
obtained by Schneider (2002), who finds that the shadow economy of CEE countries is 
smaller in size than that of FSU countries. A large shadow economy reduces the state’s 
tax collection, thus affecting the revenues governments need to provide public goods 
and to build trustworthy institutions. The incentive for enterprises to evade taxes 
increases and more bribes are paid to protect themselves (see Levin and Satarov 2000). 
It may be argued that conditional cooperation may be driven by higher trust. To analyze 
this proposition, we add several trust variables to the previous specification presented in 
Table 2 (eq. 2). Positive actions by the state are intended to increase taxpayers’ positive 
attitudes and commitment to the tax system and thus to compliant behavior (Smith 
1992, Smith and Stalans 1991).  If the state acts in a trustworthy way, then taxpayers 
might be more willing to comply with the taxes5. We use two trust variables, TRUST IN 
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM and TRUST IN PARLIAMENT, to check the robustness of 
the trust variables. These variables allow us to analyze trust at the constitutional level 
(e.g., trust in the legal system), thereby focusing on how the relationship between the 
state and its citizens is established; they also allow us to analyze trust more closely at 
the current politico-economic level (e.g., trust in parliament). We are also going to 
analyze whether individuals’ satisfaction with the way democracy is developing in a 
country (SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY, see Table A1 in the Appendix), and 
their attitudes regarding a democratic political system (defined as PRO DEMOCRACY 
1 and PRO DEMOCRACY 2, see also Table A1), have an impact on tax morale. In 
general, a government that commits itself ahead of time with democratic rules imposes 
restraints on its own power and thus sends out a signal that taxpayers are treated as 
responsible persons. Strong democratic rules signalize that citizens are not ignorant or 
uncomprehending voters, which might create or maintain a certain social capital stock. 
                                                 
5 Frey and Feld (2002), using Swiss data, make the empirical finding that a respectful treatment of 
taxpayers by the tax administration reduces tax evasion.  
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If taxpayers are in a better position to monitor and control politicians, their willingness 
to cooperate and pay taxes increases. It can therefore be supposed that a higher degree 
of satisfaction with a country’s democratic institution leads to a higher tax morale. 
Previous studies have shown that more possibilities of direct political participation lead 
to a lower tax evasion and a higher intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (see Pommerehne 
and Weck-Hannemann 1996, Frey 1997, 2003a, Alm, McClelland and Schulze 1999, 
Frey and Feld 2002, Feld and Tyran 2002 and Torgler, Schaltegger and Schaffner 2003, 
and Torgler 2003d). 
The results in Table 4 indicate that both trust variables have a statistically significant 
positive effect on tax morale. An increase in trust in the justice system or in parliament 
by one unit raises the percentage of persons indicating the highest tax morale by more 
than 3 percentage points. Furthermore, an increase in individuals’ satisfaction with the 
way democracy is developing by one unit raises the proportion of persons stating that 
tax evasion is never justified by 1.5 percentage points. There is also a positive 
correlation between tax morale and the variables PRO DEMOCRACY 1 and PRO 
DEMOCRACY 2. The trust and democracy variables generally show the relevance of 
institutions that enhance political participation and trust in parliament and in the justice 
system. Such institutions have beneficial effects on social capital and the political 
outcome, not only in Western Europe, but also in Eastern Europe (see Frey 2003b). 
Introducing these variables does not affect the size and the significance of the variable 
PERCEIVED TAX EVASION. The marginal effects are still between 7.1 and 7.7 
percentage points and the coefficient is highly statistically significant. Thus, the effect 
of conditional cooperation remains robust. Additionally, no changes are observed for 






Further Determinants of Tax Morale (standard errors adjusted for clustering on countries) 
 
                                
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
   Effects   Effects   Effects   Effects   Effects 
INDEPENDENT V. Eq. 4     Eq. 5     Eq. 6     Eq. 7    Eq. 8     
                
PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.178*** -4.590 -0.071 -0.179*** -4.650 -0.071 -0.187*** -4.770 -0.074 -0.199*** -4.950 -0.079 -0.193*** -4.860 -0.077 
(6) Trust and Democracy                
TRUST IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 0.082*** 4.510 0.033             
TRUST IN THE PARLIAMENT    0.094*** 4.790 0.037          
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY       0.039** 2.420 0.015       
PRO DEMOCRACY 1          0.112*** 5.330 0.044    
PRO DEMOCRACY 2             0.072*** 4.470 0.029 
ALL OTHER VARIABLES INCLUDED                
                
Number of observations 31602   31371   30915   29971   30139     
Prob > chi2  0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000   
Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale (0 to 3). In the reference group are AGE<30, MAN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYED, EASTERN EUROPE.  




It may be argued that the observed effect of conditional cooperation may be driven by 
one or other of the two regions (Eastern or Western Europe). To test the robustness of 
conditional cooperation, it is worthwhile to investigate the two regions independently, 
using the specifications presented in Table 4. It can also be supposed that some control 
variables act differently. For example, Barro and McCleary (2002) point out that 
Communist countries tried to eradicate organized religion, regarding it as “competitive 
with the Communist quasi-religion” (p. 13). This may lead to the tendency for the 
church to have less impact on social norms in Eastern European countries. If this is the 
case, we should observe a lower impact for the variable CHURCH ATTENDANCE. 
We may also observe differences regarding the occupation status. In many transition 
countries, self-employed individuals are confronted with, and restricted by, high 
transaction costs imposed by inefficient government activities69. A situation of 
interventionism and bureaucracy “over-government” on the one hand – and the lack of 
sufficiently secured property rights “under-government” on the other hand – may, in 
particular, have a negative impact on self-employed taxpayers (see Frey and 
Eichenberger 1999). 
Table 5 presents the separate results for Western and Eastern Europe. The conditional 
cooperative effect is stronger in Western Europe, but the coefficient for Eastern Europe 
stays statistically significant. An increase in the perceived tax evasion scale by one unit 
reduces the percentage of persons stating that tax evasion is never justified by around 10 
percentage points in Western Europe and more than 4 percentage points in Eastern 
Europe. These results suggest that conditional cooperation is not driven by the results of 
Western Europe.  
The trust and democracy variables are statistically significant in both regions, but the 
marginal effects indicate that they have a stronger impact on tax morale in Western 
Europe than in Eastern Europe. The estimated coefficients for the trust and democracy 
variables point to the importance of involving the taxpayers in the decision process in 
order to maintain or improve tax morale. Social capital is both a precondition and 
consequence of a higher political participation.  
                                                 
6 Djankov et al. (2000) show with data from 75 countries that, in general, heavier regulation of entry goes 
hand in hand with higher corruption and a higher shadow economy. On the other hand, countries with 
more democratic and limited governments have less entry regulations. 
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Finally, we test whether the large impact of the variable PERCEIVED TAX EVASION 
on tax morale is driven by a subset of countries. Therefore, the specification derived in 
eq. (1) is estimated separately for each country in our sample. The results of the 30 
regressions are presented in Table 6. This allows us to get a robust picture of pro-social 
behavior in the countries investigated. For simplicity, only the coefficient for the 
variable PERCEIVED TAX EVASION is reported. In 27 of the 30 countries, the 
coefficients are highly statistically significant with a negative sign (exceptions are 
Portugal, Romania and the Slovak Republic). The estimates reveal higher marginal 
effects for Western European countries than for Eastern European countries. In 11 out 
of 16 cases, the marginal effects exceed 10 percentage points in Western Europe, 
compared to only 3 out of 14 cases in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, there is strong 
evidence of conditional cooperation in most European countries. The more individuals 
expect that others will cooperate, the higher is the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. 
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 Table 5 
Determinants of Tax Morale in Western and Eastern Europe (standard errors adjusted for clustering on countries) 
                                      
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
   Effects   Effects   Effects   Effects   Effects   Effects 
INDEPENDENT V.                               
WESTERN EUROPE Eq. 9a     Eq. 10a     Eq. 11a     Eq. 12a    Eq. 13a     Eq. 14a   
PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.252*** -5.430 -0.100 -0.239*** -5.240 -0.095 -0.241*** -5.450 -0.095 -0.251*** -5.550 -0.099 -0.262*** -5.750 -0.103 -0.254*** -5.410 -0.100 
(6) Trust and Democracy                   
TRUST IN THE JUSTICE 






             
TRUST IN THE PARLIAMENT       0.124*** 4.960 0.049          
SATISFACTION WITH 






       
PRO DEMOCRACY 1             0.149*** 4.430 0.059    
PRO DEMOCRACY 2                0.086*** 3.250 0.034 
ALL OTHER V. INCLUDED                   
Number of observations 17807   17415   17244   16895   16907   17004   
Prob > chi2  0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     
EASTERN EUROPE Eq. 9b     Eq. 10b     Eq. 11b     Eq. 12b    Eq. 13b     Eq. 14b   
PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.116** -2.240 -0.046 -0.112** -2.160 -0.045 -0.110** -2.140 -0.044 -0.117** -2.270 -0.047 -0.125** -2.300 -0.050 -0.122** -2.320 -0.049 
(6) Trust and Democracy                   
TRUST IN THE JUSTICE 






             
TRUST IN THE PARLIAMENT       0.040** 1.970 0.016          
SATISFACTION WITH 






       
PRO DEMOCRACY 1             0.088*** 4.220 0.035    
PRO DEMOCRACY 2                0.074*** 3.000 0.030 
ALL OTHER V. INCLUDED                   
Number of observations 14803   14187   14127   14020   13064   13135   
Prob > chi2  0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     
Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale (0 to 3). In the reference group are AGE<30, MAN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYED.  Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 
0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest tax morale score (3). 
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Table 6 
Conditional Cooperation in the Evaluated Countries 
 
        
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
   Effects 
CONDITIONAL COOPERATION    
VARIABLE: PERCEIVED TAX EVASION Eq. 10     
    
COUNTRIES    
Western European Countries    
Germany  -0.330*** -6.47 -0.129 
Austria -0.290*** -4.22 -0.113 
Belgium -0.406*** -9.36 -0.152 
Great Britain -0.346*** -3.75 -0.136 
Denmark -0.479*** -7.72 -0.174 
Finland -0.318*** -4.48 -0.126 
France -0.211*** -4.35 -0.084 
Iceland -0.250*** -3.37 -0.098 
Ireland -0.373*** -5.63 -0.145 
Italy -0.303*** -6.47 -0.119 
Malta -0.587*** -5.20 -0.154 
Netherlands -0.480*** -7.47 -0.190 
North Ireland -0.150* -1.96 -0.058 
Portugal 0.162** 2.12 0.064 
Spain -0.086* -1.68 -0.034 
Sweden -0.395*** -5.28 -0.157 
Eastern European Countries      
Belarus -0.235*** -4.59 -0.074 
Bulgaria -0.167** -2.32 -0.061 
Croatia -0.385*** -4.33 -0.145 
Czech Republic -0.282*** -5.74 -0.109 
Estonia -0.196*** -3.46 -0.075 
Greece -0.114** -2.08 -0.043 
Hungary -0.236** -2.43 -0.085 
Latvia -0.101** -1.99 -0.040 
Lithuania -0.267*** -3.70 -0.100 
Poland -0.294*** -4.11 -0.114 
Romania 0.059 0.83 0.023 
Russia -0.188*** -4.60 -0.074 
Slovak Republic  -0.009   -0.18 -0.003 
Ukraine -0.227*** -3.67 -0.075 
    
      
Notes: Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal 
effect = highest tax morale score (3). The specification is based on eq. (1), considering 
each country value for the coefficient of the variable PERCEIVED TAX EVASION.  
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5. Concluding remarks 
This paper proposes that taxation is a social act and that conditional compensation is an 
important factor, explaining the extent of tax morale and therewith tax evasion. An individual 
taxpayer is strongly influenced by what he or she perceives to be the behavior of other 
taxpayers. If taxpayers believe tax evasion to be common, their tax morale decreases; if they 
believe others to be honest, their tax morale increases. Recent data for West and East 
European countries are in line with these hypotheses. The size of the effect is substantial: on 
average, when the extent of tax evasion of other persons rises by one unit (on a scale from 1 
to 4), the percentage of persons reporting a high tax morale falls by 7.4 percentage points. The 
econometric estimates also suggest that the institutional crisis, which took place in many 
transition countries after the collapse of communism, negatively affected the tax morale of 
their citizens. Within Eastern Europe, the taxpayers in countries of the Former Soviet Union 
(FSU, including Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia or Latvia) exhibit a lower tax 
morale than those in Central Eastern European countries (CEE, including Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Slovenian Republic, Bulgaria, Croatia and Poland). Trust in the judicial systems 
and in parliament, as well as positive attitudes towards democracy, tend to raise tax morale, 
but the effect of conditional cooperation on tax morale is not affected. This suggests that the 
perception of how far other taxpayers comply is an influence working independently of trust 
and democratic attitudes. 
Our analysis tries to go one step further than the standard economic theory of tax evasion, 
based on a narrow concept of Homo Oeconomicus acting in isolation. The concept of tax 
morale has been introduced to build a bridge between the perception individual taxpayers have 
about the behavior of other taxpayers, and their personal decision on whether, and to what 
extent, to evade their own taxes. As has been shown in various empirical studies, tax morale is 
a crucial determinant of taxpaying behavior, but in most studies so far, it has been treated as an 
exogenous factor. The determinants of tax morale introduced in this paper, in particular the 
concept of conditional cooperation, help us to gain a better understanding of the considerations 





Description of Variables 
 
Variable Derivation 
TAX MORALE (dependent 
variable) 
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can 
always be justified, never be justified, or somewhere in between. Cheating on 




According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following: Cheating on 
tax if they have the chance (4= almost all, 1= almost none). 
TRUST IN THE JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the justice system: is it a 
great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or 
none at all? (4= a great deal to 1=none at all). 
 
TRUST IN PARLIAMENT Could you tell me how much confidence you have in parliament: is it a great 
deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none 




On the whole, are you very satisfied, quite satisfied, not very satisfied or not at 
all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country? (4= very 
satisfied, 1=not at all satisfied). 
 
PRO DEMOCRACY1 Would you say that having a democratic political system is a very good (4), 
fairly good (3), pretty bad (2) or very bad (1) way of governing this country 
(scale 1 to 4).  
 
PRO DEMOCRACY2 Democracy may have its problems, but it’s better than any other form of 




Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, how often do you attend 
religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a 
month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often, practically never or 
never. (8= more than once a week to 1=practically never or never) 
 
EDUCATION At what age did you complete or will you complete your full time education, 
either at school or at an institution of higher education? Please exclude 
apprenticeships. 
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